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This paper proposes and analyzes a life-cycle model of consumption by couples. The
model is considerably more complicated than the standard model for singles because it has to
account for the welfare of a surviving spouse. The determinants of consumption are the survival
paths of each spouse, bequeathable wealth, the flow of annuities both before and after the death
of one of the spouses, a motive for bequeathing at the death of the surviving spouse, and the
parameters of the utility functions of the couple and of each spouse if widowed. The analysis
shows how consumption and the rate of change of bequeathable wealth react to variations in these
determinants, and it compares the consumption level of a single person to a couple. Summaries
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The goal of this paper is to analyze a model to explain consumption by couples.
It is an extension of the model for singles by Yaari (1965), and therefore emphasizes the
role of mortality risk. It also allows for a what I call a "true" bequest motive,
bequeathing by a couple to the next generation, or at least to others outside of their
own two-person household. The distinction between a true bequest motive and simply
the provision for a surviving spouse is important because the surviving spouse is the
extension of the original household, and the survivor had a direct influence in choosing
the consumption by the couple when the deceased spouse was alive. This makes the
situation very different from a true bequest where the bequest depends at least partly
on motives other than purely selfish consumption and where the bequeathed has no
direct control on the consumption by the household. There is also a difference in the
planning horizon which causes important differences for public policy: if a couple
desires to give bequests to their children, and possibly to their grandchildren, they will
act in a very different way in response to, say, an increase in Social Security benefits
than if they only want to bequeath to each other.
There is, of course, a voluminous literature on the life-cycle model, but almost
without exception it deals with the life cycle of an individual, despite the fact that most
of the population is married.1 When mortality risk is low this is not very important for
a wide range of research questions, but among the elderly where mortality risk is high
the model of a single person is not an accurate description of the decision problem
facing a couple.2 In many of the papers the focus of the work is on other aspects of
uncertainty such as uninsured medical expenses, and the further complication of
considering a couple may make the models untractable; but in other papers the focus is
on mortality risk, and thinking of just the life-cycle of a single person may lead to
inaccurate conclusions. For example, a number of writers have concluded that the rate
of dissaving is so low that a bequest motive must be important (Bernheim, 1987;
Modigliani, 1986, 1988; Kotlikoff, 1988; Kotlokoff and Summers, 1988). Yet at those
ages when mortality risk is high enough that the life cycle model predicts substantial
dissaving, the rate of transition from couples to singles is also high. Without taking
into account the change in composition with age, it is difficult to assess what the
1Exceptions are Kotlikoff and Spivak, 1981, and Brown and Poterba, 1998.
2See for example, Blundell, Browning and Meghir, 1994; Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes, 1995;
Levin, 1995; Attanasio and Browning, 1995; Laitner and Juster, 1996. In their lengthy review of
household saving, Browning and Lusardi (1996) discuss in a paragraph the issue of the age of the
household when there is more than one member, but go no further.
1appropriate rate of dissaving should be.
The setting for this paper is of a retired couple that has bequeathable wealth and
annuities. For most of the analysis, I will assume that the annuities are indexed, as in
the U.S. Social Security system. I will further assume that there is a borrowing
constraint such that bequeathable wealth cannot become negative, even though the
couple has a claim on Social Security benefits. That is, future benefits cannot be use as
collateral for a consumption loan.3 The only uncertainty is mortality risk.
The determinants of consumption and, therefore, of wealth change are mortality
risk, bequeathable wealth, the path of annuities including Social Security, and taste
parameters particularly a bequest motive. The objective is to analyze how variation in
each of these affects consumption and wealth paths. Because the ultimate objective of
this line of work is to use the model in estimation, the analysis will use methods that
can easily translate into empirical models.
The analysis shows that a true bequest motive will reduce the rate of wealth
decumulation by couples just as it does among singles. It is much more difficult to
analyze how the rate of wealth decumulation by the couple will change with age because
the rate depends on the ages of both spouses and on the economic circumstances facing
each after widowing. Nonetheless, the wealth of couples should decline at least at
advanced age. A comparison of the rates of consumption and dissaving by singles and
by couples depends on the economic circumstances of each, as well as utility parameters
and mortality risk, so that no universal prediction can be made. In a leading example,
greater risk aversion, smaller returns-to-scale in consumption, and a low risk of extreme
longevity should lead to greater dissaving by couples relative to singles.
The theoretical analyses form the basis of some informal tests of the life cycle
model (LCH) of consumption by couples and by singles. I give some results on
consumption levels and consumption change and on wealth decumulation by couples
and singles that support the LCH.
2. Model of Consumption by Singles.
The optimal choice of consumption by a couple will depend on the value of
wealth to the surviving spouse in the event that one spouse dies. The value of wealth
will depend on the subsequent choice of consumption made by the surviving spouse, and
the optimal choice is the solution to the utility maximization problem by a single
person. Therefore, the analysis of the couple's model requires a prior analysis of the
3in the U.S., Social Security benefits cannot be used as collateral.
2single's model, so I first spendconsiderable time analyzing the single'smodel.4
The single's problem is tomaximize in the consumption path {cjexpected
lifetime utility
Ju(ct)etaidt + JV(wj)etmtdt
The first term is expecteddiscounted utility from consumption.
=theutility flow from consumption;
p =thesubjective time rate of discount;
aj =theprobability of being alive at t;
N =themaximum age to which anyone canlive (aN =0)
The second term is the expecteddiscounted utility of bequests.
V(.) =utilityfrom bequests which may depend onthe economic status of
children in an altruistic model orin a strategic bequest model;
wt =bequeathablewealth at t;
mj =probabilityof dying at t.
I will make the usual assumptionsabout u(.): '>0 and becoming arbitrarily
large as cO,andu1 <0. I will assume that V' > 0and that V' <0, but that V'(O)is
bounded. This is reasonable inthat those outside the householdhave incomes of their
own, so that if theyreceive no bequest they still can consume.
The constraints on the maximizationare:
is initial bequeathable wealthwhich is given;
wt ￿ 0 V tis the nonnegativity constraint;
(1)
in which
r =realinterest rate (constant and known)
At =flowof annuities at time .
4Thissection is an extension of my 1989 paper,which was based on Ya.ari, 1965.
3The nonnegativity constraint on bequeathable wealth can be justified by a legal
ban on borrowing against Social Security benefits. In addition, in data very few are
observed with negative wealth, and the few tend to have negative wealth as the result of
negative business wealth. This is likely to be the result of unanticipated losses rather
than borrowing for consumption purposes. The importance of taking account of the
corner solution (Wt0) is seen from the fraction of single elderly with approximately
zero nonhousing wealth. In 1993, about 25% of those aged 70-79 and about 50% of
those aged 90-100 had wealth less than $i,O0O.
The model places considerable emphasis on annuity income, which is based on
the empirical observation of its importance: in 1994 ninety-four percent of the elderly
(65 or over) had some annuity or pension income; seventy-nine percent had more than
half of their income from annuities or pensions. I take annuities as given exogenously
for the simple reason that in the U.S. almost no one has self-purchased annuities.6
The solution to the single's problem is:
(2) =u(h+ p —r)
—hVfor Wt > 0
c=A forwt=0
and w0 given.T Here
marginal utility of consumption at time t
mt/at =mortalityrisk (mortality hazard)
V =marginalutility of bequests at time t.
A typical solution as would be found in data is shown in Figure 1. At T
bequeathable wealth has been consumed, and consumption equals annuity income after
5Author's calculation based on wave 1 of the Survey of the Asset and Health Dynamics among
the Oldest-Old. See Soldo, Hurd, Rodgers and Wallace, forthcoming.
6The high load factor on self-purchases annuities is thought to be substantially responsible
(Friedman and Warshawsky, 1988; Hurd, 1990). Taking them as given for this analysis is, of course,
a separate issue from their econometric exogeneity in a particular empirical application.
7See Hurd, 1989, for a derivation.
81f at some age greater than T annuity income declines more rapidly than the desired
consumption path, the solution will be more complicated: a lower consumption path could be optimal,
and consumption could fall below AT. This is rather unlikely, however, as it would require both
substantial inflation and large holdings of unindexed annuities.
42.1. No bequest motive.9
As long as w>0, marginal utility will follow the path in (2), but with the
restriction that the marginal utility of bequests is zero; that is, V =0.In that case, if
p > r,
du dc 0 and, therefore, --<0.
That is, consumption will always decline.
If p <r,then<0 when h is small as would be the case at young ages. At
older ages, however, h is approximately exponential so that at some age r,
h+p—r=0,and=0 at t=r.
du dc Fort>r,->0and <0.
Over a small interval (t, t8) where Wt> 0
— a+ô(r-p) 8(r-p-h)
Mortality risk, h, acts like an increase in the discount rate.
The wealth path associated with the optimal consumption path is found from the
equation of motion of wealth (1). Let A A, a constant, which would be the case for




dc At some age, r, --<0. If
dw dw dw ->0 then>0Vt>r=->0Vt>r= wN>O
9The analysis of this section is a generalized version of the analysis in Bernheim (1987).
10The annuity income of singles is rather effectively indexed: in 1994, 77 percent of elderly
singles had no private pension or annuity income, while just 10 percent had no Social Security income.
Private pensions are typically not indexed formally, but only 12% of elderly singles had 20 percent or
more of their income from private pensions (Grad, 1996), and even then some private pensions are
partially indexed, if only on an ad hoc basis.
5which violates the transversality condition for utility maximization.'1 Therefore,
dw .. .
<0V t >ras long as Wj >0.12 Thisis a main implication of the LCH.
To get an idea of the age at which wealth might begin to decline, suppose that
r= 0.03and p =0.In U.S. mortality data, h650.03 for males and h740.03 for
females. Then consumption will begin to fall at about age 66 for males and age 74 for
females, and so wealth should be declining at those ages.
2.1.1. Effects of Mortality Risk
dc
Increasing mortality risk will reduce (algebraically) --whichwill, in turn,
reduce (algebraically) .Thiscan be shown as follows.'3
Consider two paths of mortality hazard rates {h} and {h} such that h' >h.
Thus h' can be thought of as the mortality hazard path of someone who is older. Let
the optimal consumption path associated with h be c, and the optimal consumption
path associated with h be c. Suppose that c0 =c.Then,
dc dc--<.-
0 0
because of the higher mortality risk. Therefore, for a time c<ctas is shown in Figure
2. Suppose that at some later age, r, c'= c. Then,just as at t0
dcdc
dtdtrr
Because c' <Ct for most of 0 <t <T, w,thewealth path associated with c', would lie
above Wt. Therefore, at T w> 0which implies that the consumption path is not
optimal: the desired consumption path has a negative slope, yet wealthwill not decline
as long as c' <A. The conclusion is that c> c0, whichimplies that
i1j the absence of a bequest motive, all wealth should be consumed by the greatest age
possible.
12These general result hold for some other annuity paths, ones that are rising for example. If
the annuity path falls more rapidly than the desired consumption path, however, wealth will always be
held until the maximum age possible.
3It is not particularly interesting to analyze what happens when mortality risk increases
keeping life expectancy constant because there is no empirical counterpart to this analysis:variations
in mortality rates by observable characteristics change life expectancy. This makes the situation quite





Thus, if wealth is declining under h1, wealth would decline more rapidly under h. An
implication is that ceL par. at greater ages the consumption path will be steeper and
the rate of wealth decumulation greater than at younger ages.
2.1.2. Effects of initial wealth.
du dc From--u1(h1+p—r) and
d1nc 1
di CtUU
where£ =h1+ p — r, and t =— isa measure of risk aversion evaluated at ci.
Then
ci =c0e'twhere = dt.
can be thought of as the average discount rate (including mortality risk) over the
period (0, t) adjusted for risk aversion. Then
dc—dc0 _——de—(dIn c0 — e COe —
dw
—c
Differentiating the budget constraint with respect to initial wealth and using
CT A gives
-n.j4 1 j--e ut—j.,or 0




1r —rt 4 +J—C4C
dine0 0 dw0 T
A51.+WQ,where 8T =fe dt,and using
7ceTtdt =A&rtdt+ w0 =AST+ W0
In the case of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
U1-7'




and the interpretation of AST + w0 is discounted expenditures between 0 and T. If A is
small so that most of resources are from wealth
dine01
dlnw0






dc dc d In that —->0,—--willbe neciative if _1 is positive, that is, relative risk aversion
dw0 dw0 dc
increases as consumption increases (IRRA). Then the response of inc0tow0 would be
reduced relative to the CRRA case. Take c0 to be a function of w0, and then integrate




wherethe constant of integration comes from the fact that c0 =Awhen w0 =0.
Therefore, under IRRA, c0 will be less than it would be under CRRA. The is
illustrated in Figure 3a. Relative to CRRA, the consumption path will be flatter at
high levels of consumption and steeper at low levels of consumption because
dinc
For the same initial wealth level, this will require that initial consumption will be lower.
To see how this affects saving, let
8idw •_i t_C,
andis the change in the initial rate of saving for a change in initial wealth.







= 0 0 after some manipulation.
AST+w0
If consumption is declining, which is a sufficient condition for wealth to decline, the first






Thus,under CRRA,will be positive and an increase in bequeathable wealth will
cause the rate of saving to increase: if an individual is dissaving, an increase in wealth
will reduce the rate of dissaving and the wealth path will be flattened.
In the general case, however, a sufficient condition forto be positive is that
T d'
f <•
Aswe have seen this will happen ifis positive. Then the wealth path would be
flattened even further relative to CRRA.
Ifis negative,could be negative, so that an increase in initial wealth
dc div0
could case the rate of dissaving to increase. To see how this could happen consider the
somewhat artificial example illustrated in Figure 3b. Let r =0,and suppose that
utat&0t￿d9, t T and that T x c* =w0.Then initially the consumption path would
be flat at cuntilT when it would drop to A. Now suppose that wealth is increased
slightly but that because of the shape of the survival curve and discounting,
utate0t < d9, t > T. Then the additional wealth would be entirely allocated to
consuming initially atuntil all additional wealth is consumed. Ifc0Ais small and
—cis large,
dü0 dco+cO_A —
9could be made to be negative. That is, an increase in initial wealth would cause the
rate of dissaving to increase.
2.1.3. Effects of the annuity stream.
An increase in Social Security could either increase or decrease T, and the effects
on the rate of wealth change will differ. Consider first a utilityfunction such that an
increase in Social Security causes T to decline. Then, as shown in Figure 3c, the new
consumption path, c, must be everywhere above the old consumption path, c, because
consumption paths cannot cross: were they to cross the equation of motion of marginal
utility will require that the marginal utilities be the same both before and after that
point. That is, the paths would be the same. But if bequeathable wealth is to be
exhausted both at T and at T* the consumption path {c*} must lie above {c}.
The path of bequeathable wealth depends on the utility function; but because
T* <T, w will be less than to over at least one part of the interval (0, T*). If the
interval is the entire age range (0, T*), {w*} < {w} and
dw dw
0 0
Asshown in Figure 4, the interval over which w <w could be less than the entire age
range. At some age, say r, to,.. Now consider a different person with initial ageof
r and initial wealth of w. This person would have a wealth path such that
{w}< {w}. Therefore, for this person an increase in Social Security benefits would
initially cause a higher rate of wealth decumulation.
We see from this example that increasing Social Security benefits can cause
to decrease. However, this result is not general because the sign ofdepends on the
particular form of the instantaneous utility function. I demonstrate this by giving two
examples: the first is a simple utility function in which I show graphically thatis
positive; the second is the constant relative risk utility function for which I show
analytically thatis negative.
First, consider the utility function u*:
*1 \fe,c ￿ a,
U —ja,c> a.
u and ii, another utility function to be discussed below, are illustrated in Figure 5. Let
10.4 < a, (h + p) =),a constant, and r =0.The utility maximizing consumption path
is
—f a, t<T, —A,t ￿ T.
The path is illustrated in Figure 6. Let initial bequeathable wealth be w0. Then, T is
given by (a—A)T=w0. a1A>0 and
0 >0
dA(4)2
Thatis, increasing Social Security benefits increases T. Over an interval, therefore,
w > w, and an increase in Social Security would increasealgebraically. Of course,
in this particular example,
d(dw/dt)
=
= 1as can be calculated directly.
This utility function does not satisfy the strict concavity assumption. But, as
illustrated in Figure 5, a slightly modified utility function, u,wouldsatisfy strict
concavity, and it would lead to the same qualitative result.
In the second example I take the utility function to be'4
1-7
The optimal consumption trajectory is given by
c1 =A7aTe(r)(Tt)for t < T and




The consumption path implies that
'4This is the case considered by Bernheim, 1987.
11dc_ 1 8dT Th_c+ )
inwhich 6T = (+p —r). Differentiatingthe budget constraint with respect to .4,
and using the fact that CT= A,gives




6T _1& dT wo+A6T_A+ T
where 5T =etdtThen
(4 dT_ — lB0 ThOT(woA+A28T)
Because 9T and 8T are positive,is negative.15 Therefore, with this utility function,
increasing A could cause the average rate of wealth change over the interval (0, T) to
decrease algebraically, so that if wealth is declining the rate of decumulation could
increase.
However, for empirical work one would like to relate the rate of dissaving at any
time to levels of annuities. That is, we need the relationship betweenand A. From
(3) and (4)
dcri ____________ — — Ct[— — ___________




A5T is total annuity income over the period 0 to T, so that0
has the interpretation of the fraction of resources over the period that comes from initial
'5A condition for global utility maximization is that O. =+p —r)> 0.
12bequeathable wealth. This also shows that
d Inc






The first term is the product of two factors, thefirst of which is greater than one if
wealth is falling, and the second is less than one. Ifthe consumption path, which
follows the survivor curve, has a long tail, so that is large, the first term will
tend to be large and an increase in annuities will causethe rate of dissaving to increase.
If the consumption path is rather flat but thendeclines sharply so that is
d(d /dt)
W0 T
small, the rate of dissaving will decrease.Bernheiin found to be negative,
apparently the result of his assumption that mortalityrisk is constant, which implies
that the rate of change of consumption is constant.
These results also show that under some circumstances anincrease in Social





where mt is the path of mortality probabilities. Theleft-hand side is expected
discounted bequests with the wealth path w*and the right-handside is expected
discounted bequests with the wealth path w. Thus, anincrease in Social Security
benefits would decrease expected bequests.16
2.2 Bequest motive: V > 0
With a bequest motive the equation of motion of marginal utilityis
16See Hurd, 1993foran empirical estimate ofthe effect.
13du-= ut(ht+ p —i-) — hVfor Wt>0
For a fixed level of consumption (and, therefore, Ut)abequest motive reduces and




Thus if consumption is declining a bequest motive will flatten the consumption path.
Over an interval (0, t) where w > 0
u0 =atet + Jv8 (r-p)sds
This equation says to allocate consumption between time 0 and time t in such a way
that the utility loss is balanced by the discounted expected utility gain from
consumption at t plus the discounted increase in expected utility from bequests. A
bequest motive will cause wealth decline more slowly; that is, more wealth will be held.
This can be shown as follows.
Let u(l) be marginal utility when there is a bequest motive and Ut(O)be
marginal utility when there is none. Similarly for ct(1) and c(0), and Wt(l) and wt(O).
Let{c(0)} be the optimal consumption path of someone without a bequest motive and
suppose that at some T, wT(0) =0.T could be N, the maximum age possible.
Let initial wealth be the same: w0(l) =w0(0).If initially consumption is chosen






Thus initially Ct(l) > Ct(O)




14and c(1) would remain greater than c(O)asshown in Figure 7.
Therefore, wt(1) <wt(O) V L But wT(O) =0=tDT(1) <0,which violates the
nonnegativity restriction. The conclusion is that c0(l) must be chosen to be less than




That is, a bequest motive causes wealth to decline more slowly
This kind of result holds more generally under uncertainty, provided the
distribution of random events is the same for those with and without a bequest motive
(Hurd, 1987).
3. Utility maximization by Couples
The model for couples is similar to the model for singles: couples have a utility
function defined over consumption while both spouses are alive, and they get utility
from contemplating "bequests." However, there are two types of bequests: wealth to a
surviving spouse, and wealth to a third person at the death of the surviving spouse.
In this situation couples will choose a consumption path {C}tomaximize18
f U(C)etadt + I M(wt)etpmdt + .1 F(wt)&Ptpf dt + J V(wt)&tmtdt
U(.) =utilityfunction of the couple
p =subjectivediscount rate of the couple
at =probabilitythat both spouses will be alive at t.
M(.) =widower'sutility of wealth
=probability(density) that the husband becomes a widower at t; that is,
the probability that the wife dies at t and the husband is still alive at t.
F( .) = widow'sutility of wealth
=probability(density) that the wife becomes a widow at t.
V(.) =utilityfrom true bequests (bequeathed outside the household)
Wt =bequeathablewealth at t
'71n this model all of the wealth of the couple is transferred to the surviving spouse at the
death of one spouse. It is only at the death of the second spouse that wealth is inherited by children or
others.
18See Hurd, 1992a.
15mt =theprobability (density) that the surviving spouse dies at •
Thisobjective function has the same structure as in the single's problem: the couple
gets utility from consumption and utility from "bequests." The utility from bequests is
in three parts: future utility of the widower, future utility of the widow, and future
utility from a true bequest.
The maximization is subject to
=rw
—C+ A
r =thereal rate of interest (fixed and known);




(5) =U(h+ p —r)
—(M+
U =marginalutility of consumption by the couple
h =thecouple's mortality risk (the probability density that one of them will die
at t given that neither has died before t)
M=widower'smarginal utility of wealth
F =widow'smarginal utility of wealth
=mortalityrisk of the wife (the probability density that the wife will die at t
given that she has survived to t)
=mortalityrisk of the husband
The solution has the same structure as the solution to the single's problem with the last
term in (5) corresponding to the last term in (2). In the case of the couple the wealth
goes to the surviving spouse; in the case of the single person the wealth goes tothe
heir.
The marginal utility of true bequests does not appear in the solution because the
probability that both spouses die in a short period is zero. The bequest motive acts
through the marginal utility of wealth of the widow or widower.
Because of time separability of utility, the couple maximizes utility starting from
any arbitrary date. That is, as long as the couple is alive, we can put t =0and solve
16the utility maximization problem forward from that date.
At a later time t either both spouses are alive, the husband only is alive, the wife
only is alive, or both have died, so the probabilities of these outcomes must sum to 1.
That is,
at =1—— — s m5ds
0
whereb =probabilitythat the widower only is alive at t, and f =probabilitythat the
widow only is alive at t. If t becomes small the probability that both will die between 0
and t goes to zero. Therefore, in a small interval of time a bequest takes place through
the surviving spouse, not through the simultaneous deaths of both spouses: one spouse
must die in order that the probability the other spouse will die and leave a bequest
becomes positive. Typical trajectories of the probabilities at, b, f and the density nit
areshown in Figure 8.
The relationship between h,andicanbe found as follows. Let h0 be the
probability density that one spouse or the other or both die at t given that both are
alive at 2 =0.
at =1—Jh50d3
and
da dbdf ho= —=-+-+mt
Let cbbethe mortality probability density of all females alive at 2 =0,andthe
mortality probability density of males.
Under the assumption that the mortality outcomes of the husband and the wife
are independent, the probability that the husband only is alive at 2 is given by
= ds[1 —f[L50ds]
Similarly,
= ds [1— sO ds]
Then,
— sOds] _00ds ' as2•0,
17This says that the rate of flow of husbands to widowers is given by the mortality risk of
wives.




mt =/1tbt+ —0as t —*0because b and f —*0.
Finally, ho —fc5 +ast —0.This holds at any t so that h =t +ALt.Thatis, the
mortality risk of the couple is the sum of the mortality risks of each spouse.'9
In (5), h + p will be larger thanif the couple is sufficiently old because both
and /2tincreaseapproximately exponentially. Therefore, in the absence of the second
term in (5), U would increase. The second term flattens the path of U and could even
cause it to fall. Thus, with the usual assumption that U(.) is concave,the second term
flattens the path of consumption, which would otherwise be declining, and could even
cause the path to rise. This "bequest" motive (to leave wealth to the surviving spouse)
has the same effect on the consumption path of a couple as it does on the consumption
path of a single person. Beyond the fact that the consumption path is flattened,the
path of marginal utility is not easy to analyze because neither M nor Ft couldbe
expected to be constant as bequeathable wealth varies.
3.1. No true bequest motive.
In the absence of a bequest motive, a terminal condition is that wt must go to
zero at the greatest age to which the household could survive. Further, if one spouseis
very old (say the husband), and approaches the greatest age towhich that spouse could
possibly live, the couple should decumulate wealth provided the younger spouse is not
too young. This can be seen as follows.
If N is the maximum age to which the husband can live, a condition for utility
maximization by the couple is that U Ft as t—+N. (This will be shown section 3.2).
Also, Mt—0 as t—N:shouldthe wife die, wealth is worth little to the widower because
with increasing mortality risk, the flow of consumption will increase reducing the
marginal utility of consumption and of wealth to zero. Then,
'9This would hold with assortative mating (where long-lived men tend to marry long-lived
women). The estimation problem would be to find empirical counterparts to the individual mortality
risks, as they could not be taken from a life table.
18dU=U(h+ p —r) — + Fiz)
= + i + p —r) —+ F)
= + p —r) + —F)
—Mtc
U + p
as in the singles problem. If ,themortality risk of the wife, is greater than p —r, U
will increase and C will decline. Therefore, wealth will decline: the analysis is the
same as in the single's problem.
The conclusion is that the wealth path depends on ages of both husband and
wife. If the husband is very old and the wife is not too young (say, older than 74, as
was given in the example for singles) wealth should decline in the absence of a bequest
motive. Further, as the analysis of the single's problem showed, the rate of wealth
decline will be greater when the wife is older. In this sense, the rate of wealth
decumulation is greater among older couples.
When both spouses are retired but have many more years to live, the path of
marginal utility depends on the economic circumstances of each should the other die, in
particular a comparison of the marginal utility of consumption by the couple with the
marginal utility of wealth of each survivor:
(U — + (U — + U(p —r).
Apparently, wealth could decline at earlier ages than in the example.
The equation of motion of marginal utility (5) can be integrated over a small
interval (0, t) to give
(6) U0 Utate)t+fM880e + J
whereis the mortality probability density of women alive at 0 and ,u is the
mortality probability density of men alive at 0. The interpretation of this equation is
that the reallocation of consumption from t =0to twillresult in a loss of utility at
t =Uof U0; the offsetting gain is composed of three parts: the discounted increase in
utility should the couple live, the discounted increase in utility should the wife die
19between 0 and t, and the discounted increase in utility should the husband die between
0 and t. The approximation ignores a second-order term which is the utility from true
bequests should both spouses die between 0 and t, but this term goes to zero as t goes to
zero much faster than the other three terms because the probability density goes to
zero. Thus, the first-order conditions imply an Euler condition: marginal utility at
t0 equals the expected discounted marginal utility in all future periods.
The solution (6) is similar to the solution to the single's problem:
(r-p)tI(r-p)s = Ut aje + jV.e m80 ds
0
In both cases the path of marginal utility is altered by the expected utility from
"bequests."
3.2. Effect of a true bequest motive:
The true bequest motive (bequeathing to heirs outside of the household) operates
through MandF5: a bequest motive will increase the marginal utility of wealth of
both the widower and the widow. This increases the right-hand side of (6) which
requires that U0 be increased. That, in turn, requires that C0 be decreased with the
result that more wealth will be held. Thus, the effect of a true bequest motive is to
reduce consumption which will eventually lead to higher wealth. This is shown formally
as follows.
In the single's problem, a bequest motive reduced consumption which caused the
marginal utility of consumption to increase. A condition for utility maximization by
singles is that the marginal utility of consumption equals the marginal utility of wealth.










20Thus, if consumptionis declining, a bequestmotive will flatten theconsumption path.
This is a main implicationof LOll extended toinclude a bequest motive.
It seems natural to supposethat a bequest motivewill cause morewealth to be
held; that is, itwill reduce the rate ofwealth decumulation, and,
indeed, that is the
case. To showthe result, however, requiresthat a bequest motivereduces the level of
consumption, notthe slope of the consumptionpath, and the leveldepends on the
global survival curve,not just instantaneousmortality risk. Thisinvolve an argument
along the samelines as the argumentfor the single's model,but which is moreinvolved.
Let N be the maximum ageto which the husband canlive and P be the
maximum age to whichthe wife can live. To simplifythe discussion let F>N.2oLet
tM + .utFt = ,theexpected marginal utilityof wealth. M and F arethe marginal
utilities of wealth ofsurvivors, and they dependon wealth, theannuity path ofthe
survivor and the pathof mortality risk of thesurvivor. The arecalculated by solving
the single's problem.Let flt(l,w) indicate marginal
utility when thereis a bequest
motive and fl(O, w)indicateno bequest motive.As shown in section 2, flhas the
properties:
1. S(l,w) > t(O,w):the expected marginalutility of wealthof the
survivors is greaterwith a bequest motivethan without. Thisfollows because in the
single's problem,initial consumption is
smaller when there is abequest motive,and
lower consumption implieshigher marginal utilityof consumption.
2. (j,w) > (j,w +5), 5> 0, j=0, 1: the expectedmarginal utility of
wealth decreases inwealth. In the singles problemincreasing wealthincreases
consumption, whichdecreases the marginal utilityof consumption (whichequals the
marginal utilityof wealth).
The first-orderconditions of the couple'sproblem includes
= U(h + p —r)
—
LetT be the wife's ageat which bequeathablewealth is exhaustedwhen there is no
bequest motive.There are two cases: T<N and T ￿ N.The simplest is whenT <
because the argument
follows the same line asfor the single's problem,so consider fi:
that case.
We want to showthat C0(1) <C0(0).Supposeinstead that C0(l) = C0(0).21
20p will be apparent that the argument
holds for P <N.













Thesituation is illustrated in Figure 9•22
Fora time, C(1) > C(0) and Wt(l) <w(O). Suppose that eventually at time
r, C(1) =C(0).But r(1, w(1)) > S(0, w(O)) both because of the bequest motive
and because wr(1) <w(O). Therefore,
dC(1)dC(O)
dt dt r r
and Ct(1) will once again become greater than C(0). This implies that Ct(1) ￿ C(0)
V .Inthat wt(l) <wt(O) and wT(0)0, w(1) will become negative for some t <T,





Thatis, wealth declines more slowly with a bequest motive than without.
If T > N and C0(1) =C0(0),C(1) ￿ C(0) V t < N and w1y(1) <wN(0) by the
argument just given. Should the husband live to N, he will die with probability one
and the wife will change to the consumption path given by the solution to the single's
problem as shown in Figure 10. Let ct be the consumption by the widow. Suppose that
cN(1) ￿ cN(0). Then the wealth condition on w(1) will be violated: wN(l) <wN(0),
yet ct(l) > ct(0), t>N, by the same reasoning as in the single's problem, and, therefore,
w(1) <w(0), t> N. The path ct(l) cannot be optimal because wealth would be
exhausted before T. The argument is the same as in the single's problem.
22The figure also shows the change in the annuity stream at the death of the husband (N).
This is typical under Social Security law.
22If, however, c(1) <c(O), t> N, the lifetime budget constraint could be satisfied,
and wT(l) =0and cj(l) =A,t ￿ T' which are two necessary global conditions for
utility maximization. Whether this could happen depends on whether the two
consumption levels CN(l) and c1y(1) satisfy optimality conditions which relate the
marginal utility of consumption by the couple, U1, to the marginal utility of wealth of
the widow, FN.
The relationship between the marginal utility of consumption by the couple and
the marginal utility of wealth of the widow is found from
U NaNe N-T)+ VIss(Pm)sds+ fFsse1ds
As t—4N, the relationship becomes exact. As t—4N,a—Obecause the husband will die
with probability 1 by N. Further, MS—VNast—*N: as the mortality risk of the
husband becomes large the marginal utility of consumption by him should his wife die
goes to zero in that his mortality risk becomes large. Then wealth only has value inthe
interval (t, N) as t—N as a true bequest, and its value is VN.is the probability
density that the wife will die at sgiventhat she is alive at t, and JV5dt—0as
that is, the probability that she will die in the interval goes to zero because the wife has
positive probability of living past N. Thus 5N and
I (r-p)sd.s—*0 as t—4N
t
Becausethe probability the husband will die in the interval equals 1, and u5 is the
probability (density) that the husband dies at sgiventhat he lives to t,
N N
I f(r-p4s






That is, as t—N, the marginal utility of consumption by the couple converges to the
23marginal utility of wealth of the widow. If cN is consumption by the widow and UN is
marginal utility of consumption by the widow, UN =FNand because of returns to scale
in consumption I imagine that cN < CN(althoughthis last is not important for the
argument).
If c1y(l) <c1y(O) the wealth condition will not necessarily be violated (Figure 9).
But then
UN(1) ￿ UN(O) =UN(O)<UN(l)
The first weak inequality results from CN(l) ￿ CN(O) and the inequality results from
c1(1) <cy(O). But a condition for utility maximization by the couple with a bequest
motive is that
U1(i) =FN(l)=UN(1)
Thus, the couple with a bequest motive should choose its consumption at Ntobe less
than CN(O).Thiswill reduce consumption at all previous periods, including C0,and,in






That is, cet. par., the wealth of a couple with a bequest motive will decline more slowly
than the wealth of a couple without a bequest motive.
4. Effect of marital status
The rate of wealth decumulation by couples will differ from that of singles
because of differences in mortality risk, differences in their utility functions, and
because of differences in their resources. To make a meaningful comparison, I will make
simplifying assumptions that hold constant mortality risk and preferences. There is no
obvious best way to control for economic resources, so I will give two examples based on
24quite different assumptions.
4.1. Households have same resources.
I will compare a couple with a single person, and assume that each household has
the same bequeathable wealth and the same real constant annuity stream, and that the
annuity stream will not change at the death of one of the spouses.23 Each spouse has
the same (unisex) life table, or, for simplicity is the same age, the age of the single
person. There is no true bequest motive.
Let the instantaneous utility function of singles be u(c), and the instantaneous
utility function of couples be U(C). I assume that the two spouses are identical in their
utility functions, and that each utility function is the same as that of singles. Let
household utility be the sum of the utilities of each spouse, and then household
consumption will then be divided evenly between the spouses. In particular let
U(C) =2u()where k is a returns-to-scale parameter: if there are no returns to scale,
k =2,and household utility simply depends on per capita consumption. If there are
complete returns-to-scale, k=1 and the household gets twice the utility from a given
level of consumption that a single person would get.I assume that 1k2.
The equation of motion of the marginal utility of the couple, U, is
=U(h+ p —r)—+ Fi)
Let fit=, withthe second equality coming from the assumption that the spouse
are the same age. M and F are the marginal utility of wealth of the widower and of
the widow, and they will be equal because each surviving spouse would solve the same
single's utility maximization problem, and would choose the same level of consumption.
Because each spouse and the single person have the same life table and would have the
same budget constraint should one spouse die, the single person and the surviving
spouse would also solve the same utility maximization problem.The solution to that
problem is characterized by
du=u(g+ p —r)
and the marginal utility of wealth of the surviving spouse will equal the optimal
marginal utility of consumption by the single person. That is, Ut= M=F.
231n the U.S. typically the annuity would decrease with the death of one of the spouses because









Supposefor the moment that mortality risk and the parameters p and r are such
that g + p —r=0which would imply that
du= u(g+ p —r)=0.
In that bequeathable wealth and annuities of the couple and of the single are the same
by assumption, the rate of wealth change will differ according to the level of
consumption. Begin with the initial guess that the solution to the couple's and to the




Thus initially, marginal utility of the couple will be increasing or decreasing according
to the sign of
(u'() —u'(C)).
This can be stated in terms of risk aversion.
Expanding u'() —u'(C)at k =1
—ZL'(C)=— +u"() —1) for some 1 <k* <k <2.






and negative for -ye> 1.
The conclusion is thatwill be positive if risk aversion (which does not have
to be constant) is greater than 1. 1 will take this to be the normal case, and I have
previously estimated (constant) y to be 1.12.
Under the assumption that u has risk aversion greater than one (globally), at
least initially 0 and=0.Therefore the consumption path of the couple is
declining and the consumption path of the single person is flat, so that consumption by
the couples will become less than consumption by the single as shown in Figure 11.
Suppose that at some later time, the two consumptions become equal again.
Now comparison of the consumption paths requires a modification of the preceding
argument because g+p —r>0due to increasing mortality risk with age, and to the
fact that wealth of the couple is greater than wealth of the single person.
First, suppose as before that consumption by the surviving spouse would be the
same as consumption by the single person. Then,
dU ,C () __=u(1)(2g+p—r)—2gu(C)
=2{[u'()
—u'(C)]g+ u'()[g + p —r]}
>2'()[g + p —r}>2u'(C){g+ p —rJ
,dt
dt'
usingthe fact that u'() —u'(C)>0.Thus, were bequeathable wealth the same,
>providedrisk aversion is greater than one. However, the wealth of the couple
is now greater than the wealth of the single because consumption by the couple has
been less. Therefore consumption by the surviving spouse would be greater than
consumption by the single, which implies that the marginal utility of wealth of the
surviving spouse is less than marginal utility evaluated at the consumption level of the
27dU dt
single. Thus, -—>---whenu ()in(i)isevaluated at the consumption level of the
single. Evaluated at the consumption level of the surviving spouse twouldbe smaller
so that, a fortiori,
dU du
Thus, the path of consumption by the couple would remain below the path of
consumption by the single as shown in the figure. This, however, cannot be the optimal
path of consumption by the couple because at T bequeathable wealth of the coupleis
positive: at T bequeathable wealth of the single person is zero and the wealthof the
couple is strictly greater; yet because desired consumption by the couple will beless
that A at T the wealth of the couple wealth will increase. Therefore should each
spouse live to the maximum age possible, the couplewould die with positive wealth,
which violates a transversality condition.
The conclusion is that initially consumption by the couple will be greater than
consumption by the single person, and, therefore, that wealth of the couple will decline
more rapidly than the wealth of the single person.
4.2. Households have same resources per capita
In the first example, the couple had the same resources as the single. Now I
suppose that each spouse has the same resources asthe single, so that per capita
resources are the same. In particular, let the wealth of each spouse be w andthe real
annuity of each be A. Thus, initially the couple has wealth of 2w and a real annuity of
2A. Should one spouse die immediately the survivor will have wealth of 2w and an
annuity of A. I will compare the rate of wealth decumulation of the couple with a
single with wealth w and annuity A. The difference between the couple and the single
will be in returns-to-scale in consumption, the risk of dying with wealth, and the level
of wealth of a survivor. It will be useful to consider the problem in terms of per capita
wealth, annuities and consumption. In that initially per capita wealth and annuities are
the same for the couple as for the single, the rate of wealth decumulation will only
depend on which has greater per capita consumption.
As before let the utility function of the couple be U(C) =2u()2u() where
c =isper capita consumption and, in a change of notation,k is a rescaled person-
equivalents parameter with k = indicating that each married person is equivalent to
of a single person, (complete returns-to-scale) and k =1indicating two marrieds are
28equivalent to two singles (no returns-to-scale).I will take the case of constant relative
risk aversion because, as we will see, the results depend on parameters even in the
context of this utility function, so little is to be gained from greater generality. Thus,
let
















Then, because -= 2
dc 2 2 c,7c =— +
Thus for the couple
d1nc— 2Ii k' -_—gii— )
Forthe single
29dlnct 1
In that per capita wealth and annuities of the couple and the single are the same,
a good initial guess is that the couple chooses the same level of consumption per capita
as the single so that the two households would decumulate wealth at the same rate.
Their consumption paths will be the same if the rates of change of log consumption are
the same or if
—g[1—k(-)] =—
or
13\ k7(E.r7 — \ I kCtJ 2
Table1 gives combinations of k, y andthat satisfy this equality. Larger values of
each parameter than those shown in the table will make the left-hand side of (8) less
than ,andthen couples will reduce their consumption faster than singles.24 Consider,
for example, k =0.63,which is the implicit per person equivalent in the poverty scale






If y> 1.83 and the other parameters remain the same the LHS of (9) will become less
than the RHS: that is increases in risk aversion would reduce (algebraically) the slope
of the consumption path of couples relative to the slope for singles.




as shown in Figure 12. Than per capita consumption by each of the spouses would
become less than consumption by the single so that per capita wealth of the couple
would become greater than per capita wealth of the single. If, as time passes, the LHS
of (8) remains less than one-half, (10) will continue to hold and the consumption path of
couples will remain below the consumption path of singles. However, at T the wealth of
24Note that > 1 and -￿k < 1.
25According to the poverty scale an elderly couple needs 26% more than an elderly single.
30the single is zero, which means than the wealth of the couple is positive, and the couple
will hold positive wealth should it survive to the greatest age possible. This violates a
transversality condition.
To see whether this happens, suppose that at, say, i-percapita consumption by





will hold at r.Theonly change in the LES of (8) from the initial situation is in : c
is consumption by the survivor should one spouse die, and cisconsumption by the
couple. Therefore, to see if the LHS of (8) is less than we need to examineat r.
In the singles model
1.
dlncdt Tor Cg=CQe







andc0isa function of initial wealth and annuities. This implies that for two different
consumption paths {6}and{}basedon different wealth or annuity levels
(11)-=-
Ct CO
aslong as neither path is liquidity constrained. At time 0, I assumed that the ratio of
per capita consumption by a survivor (whom I shall call an "original widow") to per
capita consumption by the couple was large enough that the LHS of (8) was less than .
Ifat i-thewealth of the couple is large enough that a new widow could attain the
consumption level of the original widow, the ratio of consumption by the new widow to
per capita consumption by the couple would be as large or larger because of (11)and
31the LHS of (8) would continue to be less than .Therefore,the slope of the
consumption path of the couple would again be less than the slope of the consumption
path of the single and couple's path would remain below the single's path as shown in
the figure. One might imagine this is the usual situation, particularly because per
capita consumption by the couple has been less than consumption by the single so that
the ratio of wealth of the couple to the wealth of the single is now greater than two.26
Then, the couple's consumption path cannot be globally optimal because of the
transversality condition. The global solution would require that initially the couple
consume at a greater rate than the single, and, therefore, the couple would dissave at a
greater rate.
By a similar argument if initially the path of consumption by couples is flatter
than the path of consumption by singles (the LHS of (8) is greater than ),initial
consumption will be lower and the rate of wealth decumulation by couples will be
smaller.
According to this argument, large values of k, -y andwill lead to a greater rate
of dissaving by couples relative to singles. Larger returns-to-scale in consumption
(smaller k) increase the utility from consumption by the couple, but decrease marginal
utility. Therefore, with small k the couple will reduce present consumption, reducing
dissaving. Greater risk aversion, y, reduces consumption by both singles and couples.
but more for singles: couples can share the increasing importance of the risk of dying
early. Thus as risk aversion increases the rate of dissaving by both declines but it
declines more among singles.27 A large ratio of ctoCthappenswhen the risk of living
to extreme old age is small (the survivor curve has a thin tail), as shown in Figure 13.
Should widowing happen at t =0,the survivor would consume at a high rate because
the initial wealth of the survivor would be 2w, and there is little necessity to guard
against extreme old-age. The single would also consume at a higher rate, but the
response would be less because wealth is just w.
Ihave said that at r in Figure 12, we would expect that the LHS of (8) would be
less than ,whichwould lead to the conclusions about relative rates of dissaving that I
have been discussing. However, this line of reasoning does not hold if the wealth of the
couple at r is too small, because then c,,,consumptionby a new widow, would have to
be small. The wealth of the couple at r could be small relative to the wealth of an
original widow as follows: The level of consumption by the original widow at time 0 is
determined partly by the shape of the survivor function at times beyond T. As shown
261 will return to this issue below.
27This is similar to what Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) found in a two-period model.
32in Figure 14, the survivor function could cause the original widow to set consumption
only marginally greater than per capita consumption by the couple, and, as a
consequence, have substantially greater wealth than the couple at r.InFigure 12, c
wouldbe only slightly above c until time T. Then a new widow at r could not attain
the consumption level of the original widow, and, as a consequence, the LHS of (8)
might not be less than .Shouldthat happen, the consumption paths of the couple and
the single would cross, and there is no longer a logical barrier preventing the
consumption path of the couple from being optimal. Finally, by continuity, a path of
consumption by the couple that has initial consumption slightly below initial
consumption by the single could be optimal.
Nonetheless, an implication is that large values of k, -y and(all of which would
steepen the consumption path of the couple relative to the single) will, if initial per
capita consumption by the couple and by the single are the same, increase the wealth of
the couple relative to the single, so that atit is more likely thatis large, and that
the LHS of (8) will be less than .Shouldthat happen the optimal consumption path
would require that initially per capita consumption by the couple be higher than
consumption by the single leading to higher rates of dissaving by couples. Of course,
this result cannot be established with certainty without a global specification of the
survivor curve.
4.3. Summary of the effects of marital status on dissaving.
Whether couples dissave more or less rapidly than singles depends firstly on the
economic resources of each. In the first example, a surviving spouse had twice the per
capita annuity of the couple, causing the couple to consume relatively more out of
bequeathable wealth, provided risk aversion was greater than one. Risk aversion
matters because it reduces consumption by both couples and singles, but the reduction
is greater for singles.
In the second example, per capita resources of the couple and of the single were
made the same. Then the comparison of rates of dissaving depended on parameters of
the utility function and on the risk of a very long life. If that risk is large couples will
tend to dissave more rapidly than singles.
5. Empirical findings.
The empirical implications of the single's model are: <0at some age r
33relatively early after retirement. If a second person has the same wealth and annuity
d1nc. . dw dw stream but is older, ——willbe (algebraically) less. < 0 for t> r, and ----willbe
smaller for the older but otherwise identical person. A bequest motive will decrease cL,
dc . .
increase—andincrease (algebraically) —a-—.
Inthe couple's model -<0 if one spouse is very old and the other is
moderately old (age r as in the single's problem). If a second couple has the same
wealth and annuities but is older --willbe (algebraically) less. Wealth will decline in
these circumstances. If the couple has a bequest motive, the effects are the same as in
the single's model. Couples could dissave either more or less rapidly than singles,
depending on the economic resources, the paths of mortality risk and utility function
parameters.
To compare the predictions of the analyses with outcomes, I have taken some
empirical findings about consumption levels, changes in consumption and wealth
changes from other papers.23 The consumption measures are, however, rather deficient
because they measure just part of consumption. Nonetheless, the consumption and
wealth data all lead to similar conclusions.
Table 2 shows the change in a partial measure of consumption from the
Retirement History Survey (RHS). The RHS has direct measures of the following
categories of consumption: food purchased in grocery stores, food from vendors and
home delivery, food purchased away from home, nonfood items purchased in grocery
stores, gifts and donations, recreation and membership fees, and gasoline and other
transportation expenses (but excluding automobile purchases). I estimate that the
covered categories comprise about 34% of total consumption by the elderly (Hurd,
1992b).
The changes are averages over a 10-year period. The unit of observation is a
two-year change in a household where the respondents are retired. The bulk of the
observations would be over people in their late 60's and early TO's.
As measured in the table, consumption declines, and at a rather high rate.
Consumption by couples declines more rapidly than by singles, but there is no control
for total resources. Thus the LCH model makes no prediction about the relative rates.
Table 3 shows wealth change from four panel data sets. Again the change is
calculated over retired households. We consistently see dissaving, and the rates from
the RHS and the SIPP are rather close.
28p is rather important to control for retirement status: predictions about consumption and
saving behavior while employed are much more difficult because of the income changes associated with
retirement and because of changes in the utility function associated with the increased leisure in
retirement. All the results I give are calculated over retirees.
34Table 4 has annual rates of dissaving by age and marital status from the SIPP.29
The rate of dissaving increases with age, except for couples 75 or over. Couples dissave
less rapidly than singles.
Table 5 shows the results from a test of the bequest motive. It is based on the
idea that the marginal utility from bequests will be greater among those with children
than among those without. If that is the case, the bequest motive predicts that
consumption by those with children will decline more slowly than by those without
children.30 Among singles consumption does decline more slowly if the single person has
children, but the difference is not statistically significant. Among couples with children
consumption declines more rapidly. The overall result shows no support for a bequest
motive.
Table 6 has a similar test based on rates of wealth change: a bequest motive
says that wealth should decline more slowly among parents. This is found in just one
comparison of the four. Again these results give no support for a bequest motive.31
5. Conclusion.
Couples choose a consumption level knowing that should one die the survivor
will finance consumption from the wealth of the couple and from an annuity stream,
which would generally be different from the annuity stream of the couple. The
survivor's optimal consumption path will depend on the survivor's preferences
(including a true bequest motive), mortality risk and economic resources. This choice
puts a value on the wealth of the couple, the marginal utility of wealth. If the marginal
utility is high (as it would be if the survivor were young, or had a bequest motive, or
had a low annuity), the couple would choose a low level of consumption, thus holding
more wealth. In this aspect, the situation looks like a bequest motive outside the
family: the couple holds more wealth in anticipation of giving a larger 'bequest."
However, the decision making is more interesting empirically than in the case of
a single person contemplating a bequest to the next generation. One can observe in a
typical householdlevel data set the complete financial resources that are involved in the
29Age is the age of the husband.
30A comparison of levels of consumption is not valid because of differences in wealth and
annuities.
31This test has been criticized on the grounds that parents may be able to dissave more rapidly
than nonparents because their children will act as insurance against an excessively long life. Then the
two effects (bequest motive and insurance) may roughly cancel, making the rates of dissaving by
parents and nonparents approximately. My reservation about this criticism is that we observe very few
transfers from children to parents in data.
35decision, including the likely resources of the survivor. This is rarely, if ever, true for
the study of a true bequest because data are rarely linked across generations when each
generation lives in a separate household. Further, the conscious choice of a
consumption level with an eye to the resources of the survivor is more plausibly
maintained because the survivor is involved in the decision making of the couples.
The empirical evidence based on four data panel sets is consistent with a main
prediction of the LCH: wealth declines in old age after retirement. Under the
assumption that those with children have a bequest motive and those without children
do not (or have a smaller bequest motive), the data show no support for an empirically
important bequest motive.
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38Table I
Values of risk aversion parameter leading to equal rates of consumption decline
by couples and by singles
Ratio of consumption




1.6 25.8 2.97 2.22
1.8 1.83 1.46 1.35
1.9 1.28 1.18 1.14
1.95 1.12 1.08 1.07
Note: larger values of parameers
singles.
wilireduce slopeof consumption pathof couplesrelative to
Table 2
Annual rate of consumption change (percent), average over 1969-
1979
Singles Couples All
-3.8 -4.2 .1 1
Source: Hurd, 1992b,calculated from 1969-1979 RHS.
Note:Consumption measure includes about 34 percent oftotal consumption.
Calculatedover retired singles and couples approximately ofage60-74.Table 3
Average Bequeathable Wealth Change in Panel Data
Annual Rate of
Data Set Wealth Change Source
1963, 1964 Federal Reserve* -1.2%" Mirer, 1980
NLS Mature Men -5.0% Diamond and Hausman, 1984
RHS 1969-1979 (Singles) -4.5% Hurd, 1987
RHS 1969-1979 (Couples) -1.6% Hurd, 1987
SIPP 1984, 1985 (Singles) -3.9% Hurd, 1991
SIPP 1984, 1985 (Couples) -1.8% Hurd, 1991
Surveyof FinancialCharacteristics of Consumers and Survey of Changes in Family Financing.
"Medianwealth chanee
Table 4
Annual Percentage Change inAverage Wealth
70-74 -4.8 -5.9 -5.3
75± -6.0 -3.7 -5.1
All -3.9 -1.8 -2.9









Consumption and Consumption Change
No Children Children No Children Children
C0
• 22.7 21.4 37.9 38.6
C, 21.4 20.8 36.0 36.2
-1.3 -0.6 -1.9 -2.4
(0.34) (0.23) (0.54) (0.30)
yes no






Notes: 1969-1979 RHS. Consumption in dollarsper week (1969prices). Consumption in seven categories.
about 34% of total consumption.
Table 6
Average Annual Real Wealth Change (percent)
Singles Couples
RHS SIPP RHS SIPP
-4.8 -2.6 -1.7 -4.5
-3.9 -3.2 -0.2 -0.2




Sources:RHS:Hurd, 1987; SIPP: Wang. 1991.
Note: Retired singles andcouples.RHS: bequeathable wealth excluding housing. 1984
S1PP waves 4 and 7: bequeathable wealth including housing.
Singles Coupleswo
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